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Abstract
In digital goods auctions, there is an auctioneer who sells an item with unlimited supply to a
set of potential buyers, and the objective is to design truthful auction to maximize the total profit
of the auctioneer. Motivated from an observation that the values of buyers for the item could be
interconnected through social networks, we study digital goods auctions with positive externalities
among the buyers. This defines a multi-parameter auction design problem where the private valuation
of every buyer is a function of other winning buyers. The main contribution of this paper is a truthful
competitive mechanism for subadditive valuations. Our competitive result is with respect to a new
solution benchmark F (3); on the other hand, we show a surprising impossibility result if comparing
to the benchmark F (2), where the latter has been used quite successfully in digital goods auctions
without extenalities [15]. Our results from F (2) to F (3) could be considered as the loss of optimal
profit at the cost of externalities.
1 Introduction
In economics, the term externality is used to describe those situations where the private costs or benefits
to the producers or purchasers of a good or service differs from the total social costs or benefits entailed
in its production and consumption. In this context a benefit is called positive externality, while a cost
is called negative. One need not go too far to find examples of positive external influence in the digital
and communications markets, when a customer’s decision to buy a good or purchase a service strongly
relies on its popularity among his friends or generally among other customers, e.g. instant messenger
and cell phone users will want a product that allows them to talk easily and cheaply with their friends.
Another good example may be given by social networks, where a user appreciates higher a membership
in the network if many of his friends are already using it. There exist a number of applications like
quite popular Farm Ville in online social network Facebook, where a user would have more fun when
playing it with his friends. In fact, quite a few of such applications explicitly reward players with a big
number of friends.
On the other hand, the negative external effects take place when a potential buyer, e.g. a big
company, incures a great loss, if a subject it fights for, like small firm or company, comes to its direct
competitor. Another well studied example related to computer science may be given by allocation of
advertisment slots [1, 12, 13, 14, 16, 22], where every customer would like to see a smaller number of
competitors’ advertisements on a web page that contains his own advert. One may also face mixed
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externalities as in the case of salling nuclear weapons [20], where countries would like to see their allies
win the auction rather than their foes.
In contrast, we investigate the problem of mechanism design for the auctions with positive external-
ities. We study the scenario where an auctioneer sells the goods, of no more than one item each, into
the hands of customers. We define a model for externalities among buyers in the sealed-bid auction
with unlimited supply of the good. Those kind of auctions arise naturally in the digital markets, where
making a copy of a good (e.g. cd with songs and games or extra copy of online application) has a
negligible cost compared to the final price and can be done at any time the seller chooses.
Recently similar agenda has been introduced in the paper [17], where athours consider bayesian
framework and study positive externalities in social networks with single-parameter bidders and sub-
modular valuations. The model in the most general form can be described by a number of bidders
n, each with a non-negative private valuation function vi(S) depending on the possible winning set S.
This is natural mechanism design multi-parameter model that may be considered as a generalization of
classical auctions with unlimited supply, i.e. auctions where the amount of items being sold is greater
than the number of buyers.
Traditionally the main question arizing in these kind of situations is to maximize seller’s revenue. In
the literature on classical aucitons without any externalities there were developed diverse approaches to
this question. In the current work we pick a different from byesian framework classical benchmark (cf.
[15]), namely the best-uniform-price benchmark called F . There one seeks to maximize the ratio of the
mechanism’s revenue to the revenue of F taken in the worst case over all possible bids. In particular
a mechnaism is called competitive if such ratio is bounded by some uniform constant for each possible
bid. However, it was shown that there is no competitive truthful mechanism w.r.t. F , and therefore to
get round this problem, there was proposed a slightly modified benchmark F (2). The only difference of
F (2) to F is in one additional requirement that at least two buyers should be in a winning set. Thus
F (2) becomes a standard benchmark in analyzing digital auctions. Similarly to F (2) one may define
benchmark F (k) for any fixed constant k. It turns out that the same benchmarks can be naturally
adopted to the case of positive externalities. Surprisingly F (2) fails to serve as a benchmark in social
networks with positive externalities, i.e. no competitive mechanism exists w.r.t. F (2). Therefore, we go
further and consider the next natural candidate for the benchmark, that is F (3).
The main contribution of the current paper is a universally truthful competitive mechanism for the
general multi-parameter model with subadditive valuations (substantially broader class than submod-
ular) w.r.t. F (3) benchmark. As a complement we furnish this result with the proof that no truthful
mechanism can archieve constant ratio w.r.t. F (2). In order to do so we introduce a restricted model
with single private parameter which in some respects resamble that considered in [17]; further for this
restricted model we adduce a simple geometric characterization of all truthful mechanisms and based
on this characterization then show that there exists no competitive truthful mechanism.
To be completely consistent we admit that besides claimed monotonicity (positive externalities) and
subadditivity restrictions on the valuation functions we additionally require that each agent derives zero
value when not obtaining the good. First, this is reallistic assumption, e.g. without a messanger or
online application any customer derives zero utility regardless of how many his friends got it. Second,
in discussion Section we argue that the later is indeed necessary condition in order to get a competitive
mechanism. We also consider some other natural extentions and show that all of them fails to archieve
a constant ratio w.r.t. any benchmark F (k) for a fixed k.
2
1.1 Related Works
Many studies on externalities in the direction of pricing and marketing strategies over social networks
have been conducted over the past years. They have been caused in many ways by the development
of social-networks on the Internet, which has allowed companies to collect information about users and
their relationships.
The earlier works were generally devoted to the influence maximization problems (see Chapter 24
of [23]). For instance, Kempe et.al. [21] study the algorithmic question of searching a set of nodes
in a social network of highest influence. From the economics literature one could name such papers
as [25], which studies the effect of network topology on a monopolist’s profits and [9], which studies a
multi-round pricing game, where a seller may lower his price in an attempt to attract low value buyers.
As usual for economics literature all of these works take no heed of algorithmic motivation.
More recently there emerged several papers [2, 7, 18] studying the question of revenue maximization
and work studing the post price mechanisms [3, 5, 8, 18].
We could not go by without a mention of a beautiful line of research on revenue maximization for
classical auctions, where the objective is to maximize the seller’s revenue compared to a benchmark in
the worst case. We cite here only some papers that are most relevant to our setting [4, 10, 11, 15, 19].
With respect to the refined best-uniform-price benchmark F (2) a number of mechanisms with constant
competitive ratio were obtained; each subsequent paper improving the competitive ratio of the previous
one [10, 11, 15, 19]. The best known current mechanism by Hartline and McGrew [19] has a ratio of
3.25. On the other hand a lower bound of 2.42 has been proved in [15] by Goldberg et.al.. The question
of closing the gap still remains open.
Organization of the Paper
We begin with all necessary definitions in Section 2. Section 3 presents a competitive mechanism w.r.t.
to benchmark F (3) for the general model with multi parameter bidding. In Section 4 we give a geometric
characterization of truthful mechanism for some restricted single-parameter cases, which we need further
is Subsection 4.2 in order to show the impossibility of designing a competitive mechanism w.r.t. F (2).
Section 4 is also furnished with a simpler and better competitive mechanism in Subsection 4.3 for one of
these special cases w.r.t. a stronger F (2) benchmark. We conclude with the Section 5 where we discuss
possible extensions of the model and give a list of open questions.
2 Preliminaries
We suppose that in a marketplace there are present n agents, the set of which we denote by [n]. Each
agent i has a private valuation function vi, which is a nonnegative real number for each possible winner
set S ⊂ [n]. The seller organizes a single round sealed bid auction, where agents submit their valuations
bi(S) for all possible winner sets S to an auctioneer and he then chooses agents who will obtain the good
and vector of prices to charge each of them. The auctioneer is interested in maximizing his revenue.
For every i ∈ [n] we impose the following quite mild requirements on vi and later in the Section 5
we will discuss in detail why most of them are indeed necessary.
1. vi(S) ≥ 0.
2. vi(S) = 0 if i /∈ S.
3. vi(S) is a monotone sub-additive function of S, i.e.
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(a) vi(S) ≤ vi(R) if S ⊆ R ⊆ [n].
(b) vi(S ∪R) ≤ vi(S) + vi(R), for each i ∈ S,R ⊆ [n]
2.1 Mechanism Design
Each agent in turn would like to get a positive utility as high as possible and may lie strategically about
his valuations. The utility ui(S) of an agent i for a winning set S is simply the difference of his valuation
vi(S) and the price pi the auctioneer charges i. Thus one of the desired properties for the auction is
the well known concept of truthfulness or incentive compatibility, i.e. the condition that every agent
maximizes his utility by truth telling.
It worth to mention here that our model is that of multi-parameter mechanism design and, moreover,
that collecting the whole bunch of values vi(S) for every i ∈ [n] and S ⊂ [n] would require exponential
in n number of bits and thus is inefficient. However, in the field of mechanism design there is a way
to get around such a problem of exponential input size by the broadly recognized concept of black box
value queries. The later simply means that the auctioneer instead of getting the whole collection of
bids instantly may ask instead during the mechanism execution every agent i only for a small part of
his input, i.e. a number of questions about valuation of i for certain sets. We note that as usual the
agent may lie in a response on each such query. We denote the bid of i by bi(S) to distinguish it from
actual valuation vi(S). Thus if we are interested in designing computationally efficient mechanism, we
can only ask in total a polynomial in n number of queries.
Throughout the paper by M we denote a mechanism with allocation rule A and payment rule P.
Allocation algorithm A may ask quarries about valuations of any agent for any possible set of winners.
Thus A has an oracle black box access to the collection of bid functions bi(S). For each agent i in
the winning set S the payment algorithm decides a price pi to charge. The utility of agent i is then
ui = vi(S)− pi if i ∈ S and 0 otherwise. To emphasize the fact that agents may report untruthfully we
will use ui(bi) notation for the utility function in the general case and ui(vi) in the case of truth telling.
We assume voluntary participation for the agents, that is ui ≥ 0 for each i who reports the truth.
2.2 Revenue Maximization and Possible Benchmarks
We discuss here the problem of revenue maximization from the seller’s point of view. The revenue of
the auctioneer is simply the total payment
∑
i∈S pi of all buyers in the winning set. We assume that
the seller incurs no additional cost for making a copy of the good. As a matter of fact, this assumption
is essential for our model, since unlike the classical digital auction case there is no simple reduction of
the settings with a positive price per issuing the item to the settings with zero price.
The best revenue the seller can hope for is
∑
i∈[n] vi([n]). However, it is not realistic when the seller
does not know agents’ valuation functions. We follow the tradition of the literature [11, 15, 10, 19] of
algorithmic mechanism design on competitive auctions with limited or unlimited supply and consider
the best revenue uniform price benchmark, which is defined as maximal revenue that auctioneer can get
for a fixed uniform price for the good. In the literature on classical competitive auctions this benchmark
was called F and formally is defined as follows.
Definition 2.1. For the vector of agent’s bids b
F(b) = max
c≥0,S⊂[n]
(
c · |S|
∣∣∣∀i ∈ S bi ≥ c) .
This definition generalizes naturally to our model with externalities and is defined rigorously as
follows.
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Definition 2.2. For the collection of agents’ bid functions b.
F(b) = max
c≥0,S⊂[n]
(
c · |S|
∣∣∣∀i ∈ S bi(S) ≥ c) .
The important point of considering F in the setting of classical auctions is that the auctioneer, when
is given in advance the best uniform price, can run a truthful mechanism with corresponding revenue.
It turns out that the same mechanism works truthfully and neatly for our model. Specifically, a seller
who is given in advance the price c can begin with the set of all agents and drop one by one those agents
with negative utility (bi(S)− c < 0); once there are left no agents to delete the auctioneer sells the item
to all surviving buyers at the given price c.
Traditionally, the major question arising before auctioneer in such circumstances is to devise a
truthful mechanism which has a good approximation ratio of the mechanism’s revenue on any possible
bid b to the revenue of the benchmark, assuming that agents bid truthfully in the latter case. Such ratio
is usually called competitive ratio of a mechanism. However, it was shown (cf. [15]) that no truthful
mechanism can guarantee any constant competitive ratio w.r.t. F . Specifically, the unbounded ratio
appears on the instances where the benchmark buys only one item at the highest price. To overcome
this obstacle, a slightly modified benchmark F (2) has been proposed and a number of competitive
mechanisms w.r.t. F (2) were obtained [10, 11, 15, 19]. The only difference of F (2) from F is in one
additional requirement that at least two buyers should be in the winning set. Similarly, for any k ≥ 2
we may define F (k).
Definition 2.3.
F (k)(b) = max
c≥0,S⊂[n]
(
c · |S|
∣∣∣|S| ≥ k, ∀i ∈ S bi(S) ≥ c) .
However, in case of our model the benchmark F (2) does not imply the existence of constant approx-
imation truthful mechanism. In order to illustrate that later in Section 4 we will introduce a couple of
new models which differ from original one by certain additional restrictions on the domain of agent’s
bids. We further give a complete characterization of truthful mechanisms for these new restricted set-
tings substantially exploiting the fact that every agent’s bidding language is single-parameter. Later we
use that characterization to argue that no truthful mechanism can achieve constant approximation with
respect to F (2) benchmark even for these cases. On the positive side, and quite surprisingly, we can
furnish our work in the next section with the truthful mechanism which has constant approximation
ratio w.r.t. F (3) benchmark for the general case of multi-parameter bidding.
3 Competitive Mechanism
Here we give a competitive truthful mechanism, that is a mechanism which guaranties the auctioneer
to get a constant fraction of the revenue, he could get for the best fixed price benchmark assuming that
all agents bid truthfully. We call it Promoting-Testing-Selling Mechanism. In the mechanism
we give the good to certain agents for free, that is without any payment. The general scheme of the
mechanism is as follows.
5
Promoting-Testing-Selling Mechanism
1. Put every agent at random into one of the sets A,B,C.
2. Denote r
A
(C) and r
B
(C) the largest fixed price revenues one can extract from
C given that, respectfully, either A, or B got the good for free.
3. Let r(C) = max{r
A
(C), r
B
(C)}.
4. Sell items to agents in A for free.
5. Apply Cost Sharing Mechanism(r(C), B, A) to extract revenue r(C) from set B
given that A got the good for free.
Bidders in A receive items for free and increase the demand of agents from B. One may say that
they “advertise” the goods and resemble the promotion selling participants. The agents in C play the
role of the “testing” group, the only service of which is to determine the right price. Note that we take
no agents of the testing group into the winning set, therefore, they have nothing to gain for bidding
untruthfully. The agents of B appear to be the source of the mechanism’s revenue, which is being
extracted from B by a cost sharing mechanism as follows.
Cost Sharing Mechanism(r,X,Y)
1. S ← X.
2. Repeat until T = ∅:
• T ← {i|i ∈ S and bi(S ∪ Y ) < r|S|}.
• S ← S \ T.
3. If S 6= ∅ sell items to everyone in S at r|S| price.
Lemma 3.1. Promoting-Testing-Selling Mechanism is universally truthful.
Proof. The partitioning of agent set [n] into A, B, C does not depend on an agent’s bids. When a
partition is fixed, our mechanism becomes deterministic. Therefore, we are only left to prove truthfulness
for that deterministic part. Let us do so by passing through the proof separately for each set A, B and
C.
• Bids of agents in A do not affect the outcome of the mechanism. Therefore, they have no incentive
to lie.
• No agents from C could gain any profit from bidding untruthfully, since their utilities will be zero
regardless of their bids.
• Let us note that the Cost Sharing Mechanism is applied to the agents in B and the value
of r does not depend on their bids, since both rA and rB are retracted from C irrespectively of
bids from A and B. Also let us note that at each step of the cost sharing mechanism the possible
payment r|S| is rising, and meanwhile the valuation function, because of monotonicity condition,
is going down. Hence, manipulating a bid does not help any agent to survive in the winning set
and to receive a positive utility, if by bidding truthfully he had been dropped from it. Neither
mis-reporting a bid could help an agent to alter the surviving set and in the same time remain a
winner. The former two observations conclude the proof of truthfulness for B.
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Therefore, from now on we may assume that bi(S) = vi(S).
Theorem 3.1. Promoting-Testing-Selling Mechanism is universally truthful and has an expected
revenue of at least F
(3)
324 .
Proof. We are left to prove the lower bound on the competitive ratio of our mechanism, as we have
shown the truthfulness in Lemma 3.1.
For the purpose of analysis, we separate the random part of our mechanism into two phases. In the
first phase, we sieve agents randomly into three groups S1, S2, S3 and in the second one, we label the
groups at random by A, B and C. Note that the combination of these two phases produces exactly the
same distribution over partitions as in the mechanism.
Let S be the set of winners in the optimal F (3) solution and the best fixed price be p∗. For
1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ 3 we may compute rij the largest revenue for a fixed price that one can extract from set
Si given Sj “advertising” the good, that is agents in Sj anyway get the good for free and thus increase
the valuations of agents from Si though contribute nothing directly to the revenue.
First, let us note that the cost-sharing part of our mechanism will extract one of these rij from at
least one of the six possible labels for every sample of the sieving phase. Indeed, let i0 and j0 be the
indexes for which ri0j0 achieves maximum over all rij and let k0 = {1, 2, 3} \ {i0, j0}. Then the cost-
sharing mechanism will retract the revenue r(C) = max(rA(C), rB (C)) on the labeling with Sj0 = A,
Si0 = B and Sk0 = C. It turns out, as we will prove in the following lemma, that one can get a lower
bound on this revenue within a constant factor of rF (C); the revenue we got from the agents of C in
the benchmark F (3).
Lemma 3.2. r(C) ≥ rF (C)4 .
Proof. Let Sc = S ∩ C. Thus, by the definition of F (3), we have rF (C) = |Sc| · p∗ and for all i ∈ Sc,
vi(S) ≥ p∗.
We define a subset T of Sc as a final result of the following procedure.
1. T ← ∅ and X ← {i|i ∈ Sc and vi(A ∪ {i}) ≥ p∗2 }.
2. While X 6= ∅
• T ← T ∪X,
• X ← {i|i ∈ Sc and vi(A ∪ T ∪ {i}) ≥ p∗2 }
For any agent of T we have vi(A ∪ T ) ≥ p∗2 because the valuation function is monotone. Now if
|T | ≥ |Sc|2 , we get the desired lower bound. Indeed,
r(C) ≥ rA(C) ≥
|Sc|
2
· p
∗
2
=
|Sc| · p∗
4
=
rF (C)
4
.
Otherwise, let W = Sc \ T . Then we have |W | ≥ |Sc|2 . For an agent i ∈ W it holds true that
vi(A ∪ T ∪ {i}) < p∗2 , since otherwise we should include i into T . However, since i wins in the optimal
F (3) solution, we have vi(S) ≥ p∗. The former two inequalities together with the subadditivity of vi(·)
allow us to conclude that vi(S \ (A ∪ T )) ≥ p∗2 for each i ∈W . Hence, we get vi(B ∪W ) ≥ p
∗
2 for each
i ∈W , since S \ (A ∪ T ) ⊆ B ∪W . Therefore, we are done with the proof, since
r(C) ≥ rB (C) ≥ |W | ·
p∗
2
≥ |Sc| · p
∗
4
=
rF (C)
4
.
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Let k1, k2, k3 be the number of winners of the optimal F (3) solution, respectively, in S1, S2, S3.
For any fixed partition S1, S2, S3 of the sieve phase by applying Lemma 3.2, we get that the expected
revenue of our mechanism over a distribution of six permutations in the second phase should be at least
1
6
· 1
4
min{k1, k2, k3} · p∗.
In order to conclude the proof of the theorem we are only left to estimate the expected value of
min{k1, k2, k3} from below by some constant factor of |S|. The next lemma will do this for us.
Lemma 3.3. Let m ≥ 3 items independently at random be put in one of the three boxes and let a, b and
c be the random variables denoting the number of items in these boxes. Then E[min{a, b, c}] ≥ 227m.
Proof. Intuitively, it is clear that for the large m the value of E[min{a, b, c}] should be close to m3 (the
expectation of each random variable a, b and c). More formally, we have three random variables with
dependency on them given by the relation a+ b+ c = m. Now consider separately one of them, say a.
Then the distribution of a is nothing else but the distribution one may get taking the sum of independent
and identically distributed random variables X1, X2, . . . Xm drawn from the Bernoulli distribution with
parameters p(1) = 13 and p(0) =
2
3 .
We may use Chernoff’s bounds on the probability of am =
1
m
∑m
i=1Xi diverging from p =
1
3 as
follows.
Pr
(
1
m
m∑
i=1
Xi ≤ p− δ
)
≤
((
p
p− δ
)p−δ ( 1− p
1− p+ δ
)1−p+δ)m
Simple calculations for p = 13 and δ =
2
9 show that for each m ≥ 17 we will get
Pr
(
a
m
≤ 1
9
)
<
1
9
.
Now, since the probability of the union of events is smaller than the sum of probabilities of every
event, we get
Pr
(
min{a, b, c}
m
≤ 1
9
)
<
1
3
.
Therefore, Pr
(
min{a,b,c}
m ≥ 19
)
> 23 and
E
(
min{a, b, c}
m
)
>
1
9
· 2
3
=
2
27
.
The latter proves the lemma for m ≥ 17. For smaller m we may compute E[min{a,b,c}]m directly, or
use more accurate estimations on a probability and verify that E[min{a,b,c}]m achieves its minimum when
m = 3.
By definition of the benchmark F (3) we have m = k1 + k2 + k3 ≥ 3 and thus we can apply Lemma
3.3. Combining every bound we have so far on the expected revenue of our mechanism we conclude the
proof with the following lower bound.
1
6
· 1
4
E [min{k1, k2, k3}] · p∗ ≥ 1
24
· 2
27
· p∗ ·m = F
(3)
324
.
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4 Restricted Single-parameter valuations
We introduce here a couple of special restricted cases of the general setting with single parameter bidding
language. For these models we only specify restrictions on the valuation functions. In each case we
assume that ti is a single private parameter for agent i that he submits as a bid and wi(S) and w
′
i(S)
are fixed publicly known functions for each possible winning set S. The models then are described as
follows.
• Additive valuation vi(ti, S) = ti + wi(S).
• Scalar valuation vi(ti, S) = ti · wi(S).
• Linear valuation vi(ti, S) = tiwi(S) + w′i(S), i.e. combination of previous two.
We note that we still require that wi(S) = w
′
i(S) = 0 if i 6∈ S. These settings are now single
parameter domains, which is the most well studied and understood case in mechanism design.
4.1 A characterization
The basic question of mechanism design is to describe truthful mechanisms in terms of simple geometric
conditions. Given a vector of n bids, b = (b1, . . . , bn), let b−i denote the vector, where bi is replaced
with a ‘?’. It is well known that truthfulness implies a monotonicity condition stating that if an agent
i wins for the bid vector b = (b−i, bi) then she should win for any bid vector (b−i, b′i) with b
′
i ≥ bi.
In single-dimensional domains monotonicity turns out to be a sufficient condition for truthfulness [6],
where prices are determined by the threshold functions.
In our model valuation of an agent may vary for different winning sets and, thus, may depend on her
bid. Nevertheless, any truthful mechanism still has to have a bid-independent allocation rule, although
now it does not suffice for truthfulness. However, in the case of linear valuation functions we are capable
of giving a complete characterization.
Theorem 4.1. In the model with linear valuation functions vi(ti, S) = ti · wi(S) + w′i(S) an allocation
rule A may be truthfully implemented if and only if it satisfies the following conditions:
1. A is bid-independent, that is for each agent i, bid vector b = (b−i, bi) with i ∈ A(b) and any
b′i ≥ bi, it holds that i ∈ A(b−i, b′i).
2. A encourages asymptotically higher bids, i.e. for any fixed b−i and b′i ≥ bi, it holds that wi(A(b−i, b′i)) ≥
wi(A(b−i, bi)).
Proof. We need in essence the following property, which we call marginal monotonicity and which holds
for linear valuation functions.
Definition 4.1. For any fixed sets S1 and S2, let
gi(ti, S1, S2) = vi(ti, S1) − vi(ti, S2). Then gi as a function of ti should be either strictly monotone
(increasing or decreasing), or constant.
Thus, in fact, one can substitute in theorem 4.1 the requirement of valuation function being linear for
the condition of marginal monotonicity. In the latter case the second condition of theorem 4.1 changes
into: for any fixed b−i and b′i ≥ bi, it holds that gi(ti,A(b−i, b′i),A(b−i, bi)) is monotone increasing or
constant. At first we prove that this condition is indeed necessary.
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Proof. If not, there has to exist b−i and b′i ≥ bi such that gi(ti,A(b−i, b′i),A(b−i, bi)) is neither monotone
increasing or constant. Then by marginal monotonicity, it is strictly monotone decreasing.
For a truthful mechanism an agent’s payment should not depend on her bid, if by changing it
mechanism does not shift the allocated set. We denote the payment of agent i for winner set A(b−i, bi)
as p and for winner set A(b−i, b′i) as p′. If the agent’s true value is bi, by truthfulness, we have
vi(bi,A(b−i, bi))− p ≥ vi(bi,A(b−i, b′i))− p′.
And if the agent’s true value is b′i, we have
vi(b
′
i,A(b−i, b′i))− p′ ≥ vi(b′i,A(b−i, bi))− p.
Adding these two inequalities, we have
vi(bi,A(b−i, bi))− vi(bi,A(b−i, b′i))
≥ vi(b′i,A(b−i, bi))− vi(b′i,A(b−i, b′i)).
This contradicts the fact that gi(ti,A(b−i, b′i),A(b−i, bi)) is strictly monotone decreasing function.
In the following, we prove that these two conditions are indeed sufficient by providing an algorithm
that computes payments. The payment algorithm is determined by the allocation algorithm by the so
called ”Myerson integral” [24, 6]. In our concrete case we can make it more explicit. For a given bidder
i let us consider S1, S2, . . . , SN as all the possible winning sets containing i (N = 2
n−1). We may define
the order >i on them by setting Sk >i Sj if gi(ti, S1, S2) is an increasing function in vi and Sk <i Sj if
gi is decreasing; naturally we get an equivalence relation =i if gi is constant. Therefore, one may split
these N sets into mi different equivalence classes, where among these different classes there is a linear
order. For convenience, we put all the sets that does not contain i into an equivalence class.
Then for each i and fixed b−i one gets a finite partition I0, I1, . . . , Is of [0,+∞] into intervals (open,
closed, half open, half closed) and isolated points such that [0,+∞] = ∪sj=0Ij ; for all bi running over
Ij , A(b−i, bi) could only change within the same equivalence class pij . More specifically, there are s+ 1
equivalence classes pi0, pi1, . . . , pis w.r.t. <i, such that for any 0 ≤ j < k ≤ s and S ∈ pij , S′ ∈ pik , we
have S <i S
′.
Let Sj be a set in pij . We define
dj = inf
x∈Ij+1
vi(x, Sj)− inf
x∈Ij
vi(x, Sj).
By the definition of equivalence classes, dj does not depend on the choice of Sj in pij . Indeed, the
definition of pij implies that vi(x, S)− vi(x, S′) = vi(y, S)− vi(y, S′) for any S′, S ∈ pij , which gives us
what we need. Then the payment for a bid bi ∈ I` may be determined as follows:
pi(bi) = inf
x∈I`
vi
(
x,A(b−i, bi)
)
−
`−1∑
j=0
dj .
Claim 1. The above payment rule makes the mechanism truthful and as a result the conditions in
Theorem 4.1 are also sufficient.
Proof. We use ui(ti, bi) to denote agent i’s utility when his true value is ti and he bids bi, given that b−i
is fixed. To prove the truthfulness it suffices to show that ui(ti, ti) ≥ ui(ti, bi) for any ti, bi and fixed
b−i. Without loss of generality we may assume that ti ∈ Ik and bi ∈ I`. For each j, let us pick a set Sj
from pij . Then we can write an explicit formula for ui(ti, bi).
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ui(ti, bi) = vi(ti,A(bi))− pi(bi)
= vi(ti,A(bi))− inf
x∈I`
vi(x,A(bi)) +
`−1∑
j=1
dj
= inf
x∈I`
(
vi(ti,A(bi))− vi(x,A(bi))
)
+
`−1∑
j=1
dj
= inf
x∈I`
(
vi(ti, S`)− vi(x, S`)
)
+
`−1∑
j=1
dj
= vi(ti, S`)− inf
x∈I`
vi(x, S`) +
`−1∑
j=1
dj .
Similarly one can get the formula
ui(ti, ti) = vi(ti, Sk)− inf
x∈Ik
vi(x, Sk) +
k−1∑
j=1
dj .
Before we prove ui(ti, ti) ≥ ui(ti, bi), we need the following inequality: If S >i S′ and x > y then we
have
vi(x, S)− vi(x, S′)− vi(y, S) + vi(y, S′) ≥ 0 (1)
This follows from the definition of >i.
Let us rewrite ui(ti, ti)− ui(ti, bi) and consider two cases.
Case 1: ti > bi. Then k ≥ ` and we get that ui(ti, ti)− ui(ti, bi) is equal to
vi(ti, Sk)− vi(ti, S`)− inf
x∈Ik
vi(x, Sk) + inf
x∈I`
vi(x, S`) +
k−1∑
j=`
dj .
After plugging in all formulas for dj = inf
x∈Ij+1
vi(x, Sj) − inf
x∈Ij
vi(x, Sj) and rearranging some terms we
can write (
vi(ti, Sk)− vi(ti, S`)
− inf
x∈Ik
vi(x, Sk) + inf
x∈Ik
vi(x, S`)
)
+
(
inf
x∈Ik
vi(x, Sk−1)− inf
x∈Ik
vi(x, S`)
− inf
x∈Ik−1
vi(x, Sk−1) + inf
x∈Ik−1
vi(x, S`)
)
+ . . .
+
(
inf
x∈I`+2
vi(x, S`+1)− inf
x∈I`+2
vi(x, S`)
− inf
x∈I`+1
vi(x, S`+1) + inf
x∈I`+1
vi(x, S`)
)
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By applying 1 to each term in parentheses we get the desired inequality.
Case 2: ti < bi. Similarly, we get that ui(ti, ti)− ui(ti, bi) is equal to
vi(ti, Sk)− inf
x∈Ik
(vi(x, Sk))− vi(ti, S`) + inf
x∈I`
vi(x, S`)−
`−1∑
j=k
dj .
Rearranging terms in a different way we can write the following.(
vi(ti, Sk)− vi(ti, S`)
− inf
x∈Ik+1
vi(x, Sk) + inf
x∈Ik+1
vi(x, S`)
)
+
(
inf
x∈Ik+1
vi(x, Sk+1)− inf
x∈Ik+1
vi(x, S`)
− inf
x∈Ik+2
vi(x, Sk+1) + inf
x∈Ik+2
vi(x, S`)
)
+ . . .
+
(
inf
x∈I`−1
vi(x, S`−1)− inf
x∈I`−1
vi(x, S`)
− inf
x∈I`
vi(x, S`−1) + inf
x∈I`
vi(x, S`)
)
Again inequality (1) applied to each term in brackets concludes the proof.
Remark 4.1. If all valuation functions are continuous, this is the unique payment rule to make the
mechanism truthful up to the additive constant (as a function of b−i) to all possible payments of i.
Since we assume pi = 0 if i is not in the winner set, then the payment is fixed as above in most cases.
However, if i wins even when bidding 0 for some fixed b−i then one can reduce the payment by a fixed
number in [0, vi(0, S1)] for all payments of i.
Remark 4.2. Marginal monotonicity is a crucial property for our fairly simple characterization. For
example if the valuation functions are of the form vi(ti, S) = min(C, tiwi(S)) one can find a truthful
mechanism with A(b−i, x) = S1, A(b−i, y) = S2 and A(b−i, z) = S1 for x < y < z. The latter example
seems to be quite natural if an agent has a budget constraint and scalar valuation function. That leads
us to an interesting question to characterize all truthful mechanisms in our model for broader class of
valuation functions.
4.2 From F (2) to F (3)
Here we show that the usage of F (2) as a benchmark may lead to an unbounded approximation ratio
even for the restricted single parameter scalar valuations. This justifies why we used a slightly modified
benchmark F (3) in Section 3.
Theorem 4.2. There is no universally truthful mechanism that can archive a constant approximation
ratio w.r.t. F (2).
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Proof. Consider the example of two people, such that everyone valuates the outcome, where both
have got the item, much higher than the outcome, where only one of them getting the item, i.e.
v1(x, {1}) = v2(x, {2}) = x and v1(x, {12}) = v2(x, {12}) = Mx for a large constant M . We note that
these are single parameter scalar valuations.
We will show that any universally truthful mechanism MD with a distribution D over truthful
mechanisms cannot achieve an approximation ratio better than M . Each truthful mechanism M in D
either sells items to both bidders for some pair of bids (b1, b2), or for all pairs of bids sells not more
than one item. In the first case, by our characterization of truthful mechanisms (see theorem 4.1), M
should also sell two items for the bids (x, b2) and (b1, y), where x ≥ b1 and y ≥ b2. Therefore,M has to
sell two items for any bid (x, y) with x ≥ b1 and y ≥ b2. Let us denote respectively the first and second
group of mechanisms in D by D1 and D2.
We may pick sufficiently small  and consider sufficiently large x, such that at least 1−  fraction of
mechanisms in D1 sells two items for bids ( x2M , x2M ). Note that
• revenue of F (2) for the bids (x, x) is 2Mx,
• revenue of M in D2 for the bids (x, x) is not greater than x,
• revenue of more than 1−  fraction of mechanisms in D1 is not greater than 2M x2M = x.
• revenue of the remaining  fractions of mechanisms in D1 is not greater than 2Mx.
Thus we can upper bound the revenue of MD by x(1 − ) + 2Mx while the revenue of F (2) is 2Mx.
By choosing sufficiently large M and small  we will get an arbitrary large approximation ratio.
4.3 Better Mechanism for Additive valuations
Assuming that each valuation function is additive, that is of the form vi(ti, S) = ti+wi(S) with only one
private parameter ti and publicly known additive factor w(Si). Then the second condition in Theorem
4.1 becomes trivial, which means that the monotonicity condition only by itself suffices for an allocation
rule to be truthfully implementable.
Corollary 4.1. If valuation functions are additive, i.e. for each i there is exactly one equivalence
class for =i, the monotonicity condition only by itself suffices for an allocation rule to be truthfully
implementable.
We further show that for this restricted family of valuations, we are able to run significantly simpler
mechanism with the smaller competitive ratio comparing to F (2) instead of F (3).
Theorem 4.3. Given any α-completive truthful mechanism M0 for unlimited supply auctions without
externalities, one may give a 2(1 + α)-competitive truthful mechanism for markets with an additive
valuation w.r.t. benchmark F (2).
Proof. We use the following mechanism
Mechanism-2
1. At probability 11+α give goods to everyone, charge each agent i price wi([n]).
2. At probability α1+α, run allocation algorithm A0 of M0 on bid vector t;
charge threshold payments according to Theorem 4.1.
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Let F˜ (2) denote the benchmark’s revenue for the same vector of bids if we forget the external additive
part of each valuation. From figure 1, we can bound the F (2) as F (2) ≤ 2F˜ (2) + 2∑i vi([n]).
Our mechanism can get the expected revenue as at least
1
1 + α
∑
i
vi([n]) +
α
1 + α
· 1
α
· F˜ (2) ≥ 1
2(1 + α)
F (2).
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Figure 1: Sort k winning agents of F (2) according to their interests. Two shaded rectangles cover at
least half of F (2) aria. Note, that we include in the rectangle corresponding to F˜ (2) at least bk2c+ 1 ≥ 2
agents.
Remark: For this competitive ratio, we do not need the property that the functions vi(S) are sub-
additive. We only need the property that it is monotone.
5 Discussion and Open Problems
To the best of our knowledge the model introduced in the current paper is the first that takes into
account positive externalities in respect of studying truthful mechanism design for auctions in a worst
case revenue maximization and the first one in algorithmic community that treats efficiently general
multi-parameter case. Because of that there are many promising ways for expansion of the model and
we would like to discuss here some possible directions. However, most of our results obtained for such
attempts are negative; thus, to get some positive results one may try some further requirements and
modifications of the model.
1. Valuations are not necessarily sub-additive. Then for any fixed k there is no competitive
mechanism with respect to F (k). A bad instance is similar to the one in section 4.2 (we let
vi(ti, [n]) >> vi(ti, S) for each i and S  [n]). However, one may consider relaxed sub-additivity
condition, i.e. L(vi(A) + vi(B)) ≥ vi(A ∪ B) for a constant L and each i ∈ A,B ⊂ [n]. Our
mechanism will be still working and remain competitive, though with additional factor depending
on L.
2. Making a copy of the good has a fixed cost for seller. For the original digital goods
auctions one may easily make a reduction to the setting with zero cost per copy: subtract the cost
from the agent’s valuation and ignore those agents whose value is less than zero. For our model
with externalities this extension may lead to an unbounded competitive ratio.
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Claim 2. If making a copy of the good has a fixed cost for seller, then the competitive ratio may
be unbounded.
Proof. Let us consider the instance with n bidders: vi(ti, S) = |S| ∗ ti for each i ∈ S ⊂ [n],
(n > 3). We let the price for making a copy be n and the vector of true interests t() be ti = 1+ ,
where 0 <  < 1n−1 . Let us notice that any truthful mechanism may extract a positive revenue
on that vector only when all bidders get into the winning set. The revenue of F (3) at the best
uniform price n(1 + ) will be n2 = n2(1 + )− n2 also with all agents being in the winning set.
This revenue is the maximum that any truthful mechanism could get on t(). Now let us assume
that there is a distribution D over truthful mechanisms and that distribution is L-competitive for
some constant L. Any truthful mechanisms allocating the good to [n] for a t(0) according to our
characterization should also allocate goods to [n] on any t() with 0 < . Thus, for each truthful
mechanism M we may consider the infinum of  such that M allocates goods to [n] on t(). We
denote as D the mechanisms in D with such infinum laying in [ 2L , ]. Note that each truthful
mechanism in D \D either allocates goods not to [n] on t() and, therefore, achieves negative or
zero revenue, or allocates goods to [n] even on t( 2L) and, thus, on t() gets the revenue to be not
more than n2 2L . Hence, rewriting the condition of L-competitiveness on t() we obtain
n2 · prob(D|D) + n
2
2L
· (1− prob(D|D)) ≥ 1
L
· n2.
Then prob(D|D) ≥ 12L−1 for any  ∈ (0, 1n−1). Taking  from { 1n , 13Ln , 1(3L)2n , . . .} we get infinitely
many disjoint sets D with prob(D|D) ≥ 12L−1 and arrive at a contradiction.
3. Limited supply. This direction also looks very hard to explore, since it is not clear even how to
define a benchmark. A simple algorithm where we merely start with [n] and successively remove
agents with low valuations may fail, since we could finish with a larger number of agents than
provided supply. In the latter case it is unclear which agents we should remove next. Another
difficulty with this direction is that one may think of limited supply as of hidden negative ex-
ternality. Indeed, if an agent buys something, then besides the increment of other’s valuations
she also decreases the supply, thus probably depriving other agents of the chance to get into the
winning set.
4. Positive valuation for an agent not getting the good. If we drop the condition that
vi(S) = 0 when i /∈ S, then we cannot hope for any constant competitive mechanism. For
example one may consider simple restricted valuation function vi(ti, S) = ti · |S|, ∀i ∈ [n] with
single private parameter ti for each agent i. Clearly, in any mechanism it will be hard to motivate
any agent to pay for the good, since agents prefer to loose and pay nothing rather than win and
pay at least something given that the size of winning set does not decrease.
Claim 3. Let vi(ti, S) = ti · |S|, ∀i ∈ [n], S ⊂ [n]. Then there is no universally truthful
competitive mechanism w.r.t. F (k) for any fixed k.
Proof. Let’s assume the contrary that there is a distribution D of deterministic truthful mech-
anisms with constant competitive ratio w.r.t. F (k). Let M = (A,P) be a mechanism in this
distribution. Clearly, to describe A it suffices to specify only the size of winning set for every bid.
We may consider a bid vector b0 = (t01, . . . , t
0
n) such that A outputs a set S0 of maximal possible
size. Note that by individual rationality the payment of each agent i should not be larger than
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t0i · |S|. Now if agent i has true type ti greater than n · t0i , while others bid b0−i, then A should
output a set S of the same size as S0. Indeed, by truthfulness we have
ti|S| ≥ ui(ti, ti) ≥ ui(ti, t0i ) = ti|S0| − Pi(b0) ≥ ti|S0| − t0i · n.
Therefore, ti > n · t0i ≥ ti(|S0| − |S|) and hence |S0| = |S|. By similar argument we get that for
any b = (t1, . . . , tn), with ti ≥ n · t0i , allocation rule A should output the set of the maximal size.
As all outcomes are the same for b > nb0 = (nt01, . . . , nt
0
n), we may also write an upper bound
n2t0i on the payment of each agent i on every such bid b.
The revenue of F (k) on each bid (t, . . . , t) is tn2. Let’s take sufficiently large t, such that at
least (1 − ) fraction of mechanisms in D output the largest possible set on every bid vector
b ≥ ( t
n2
, . . . , t
n2
). Then for the bid (t, . . . , t) the total payment of this (1 − ) fraction should
be not more than n2 t
n2
= t. Thus the total expected revenue of D is smaller than or equal to
n2t+ (1− )t, while revenue of F (k) is n2t. Therefore, the competitive ratio is not more than
n2t+ (1− )t
n2t
= +
(1− )
n2
.
Taking  sufficiently small and n sufficiently large we come to a contradiction.
We would like to conclude the discussion with a list of open problems
1. We got a constant competitive ratio w.r.t. to the fixed price benchmark. Therefore, we think it
will be an interesting research direction to obtain a competitive mechanism with a better ratio.
Also one may find it interesting to explore the lower bounds for the new model with externalities.
2. Another important theoretical question is to give a characterization of truthful mechanisms for
general valuation functions. In fact, the marginal monotonicity condition (see full version) we were
using for that may be not met when valuations functions are bounded from above, e.g. budget
constraint on the linear valuation. Moreover, in such a case there exists a mechanism that cannot
be put in our characterization.
3. Truthful mechanism design for a market with externality is an interesting and challenging research
topic. In this paper, we were studying only one particular setting. More generalization looks
interesting both for practical and theoretical points of view, for example, negative externalities.
It seems a challenging question to find a good benchmark and design competitive mechanisms.
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